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Abstract 
 
This article offers a critical assessment of academic intelligence studies in higher 
education. It argues that universities (and academics) should value this subject far 
more highly than they currently do. Doing so will enhance better public 
understanding of an increasingly important and unique device in modern 
governance. It will also improve the quality of intelligence activity by raising 
awareness of both good and bad practice, encourage lawfulness by means of public 
understanding and so defending a vital public service from ill-informed attacks in 
today’s conflicted world. This, rather than training potential officers, should be the 
primary purpose of intelligence studies. 
 
******** 
 
The study of intelligence is a relatively new field of academic inquiry and teaching. 
This article explores key issues arising from the research into, and the teaching of, 
intelligence studies in higher education, with a focus on the subject in its current UK 
context. The aim is not to list the various sites at which it is researched and taught or 
offer an exhaustive account of exactly what is taught, and by whom. Rather it is to 
provide a critical assessment of the subject itself, and to suggest that universities 
(and academics) should value it rather more highly than they do, both to underpin 
good and lawful policy-making and because teaching intelligence is sound pedagogy, 
given the unique importance for government of intelligence activity in today’s 
perilously conflicted world. This, rather than training potential officers, should be the 
primary purpose of intelligence studies. 
 
There is no dearth of academic and media voices claiming that intelligence activity 
could subvert the core values of liberal democracy (free speech, for example, or 
academic freedom) by extending its reach into both universities and the media, two 
of the most important institutions on which liberty relies. The suggestion here is that 
in Britain, at any rate, this is to misrepresent the complexity of the issue.  
 
The article begins by arguing that academic writing on intelligence studies is 
becoming too introverted, appearing too focused the ‘training’ paradigm for a 
variety of reasons. It ends by focusing on three discrete issues, each of which has 
political, moral and pedagogical urgency. These are: the ethics of intelligence activity 
(especially in respect of torture and human rights abuses by intelligence agencies), 
the interception of communications in the context of democratic acceptability; and, 
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finally, the social and moral obligations of intelligence departments in British 
universities. 
 
 
The claim made here is for the study of intelligence as an academic subject in its own 
right so as to provide for the better public understanding of an increasingly 
important device in modern governance and, ultimately, to improve the quality of 
the intelligence communities of democratic liberal states. It also, more 
controversially, makes a case for defending secret intelligence activity in the UK, 
both now and in the future from an academic perspective. The proviso in doing so is 
that the work of our UK agencies continues to be framed by law and in particular by 
an adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights. Western liberal 
democracies need the best intelligence communities they can construct. For them to 
function properly they must have the support and understanding of the public. This 
in turn means strong academic voices are required to explain what they do, and why 
they do it. 
 
Furthermore, the study of intelligence and better public understanding of its role in 
government is directly connected to the effectiveness of intelligence as a profession 
and thereby to the better safeguarding of our democracy (Glees, 2013). Without 
effective intelligence, pluralistic liberal democracy, far from being strengthened, 
would find itself fatally wounded. There is a tangible threat of this happening today. 
And were this to happen, rational free enquiry (which is the essence of higher 
education in any democracy) would also go under because without political freedom 
there can be no academic freedom and free intellectual discourse. It follows that the 
study of intelligence is not just intimately linked to sound pedagogy but also to the 
concept of the free university. If universities disseminate a better understanding of 
intelligence activity it will also make universities, and those who work in them, more 
knowledgeable about the security threats facing our free society and the unique role 
that higher education has to maintain it. In this way, universities will sustain liberty 
and genuine academic freedom within their institutional boundaries whilst 
promoting these liberal values in society more generally. 
 
 
What is Intelligence? What are ‘Intelligence Studies’? 
 
We should start by considering what ‘intelligence studies’ actually consist of, and 
what they should consist of, not least because the term ‘intelligence’ has a different 
meaning in the UK from the one it is given in the USA, and is usually taught there in a 
different way. Rather more hangs on this distinction that might at first seem 
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apparent both for what is taught and how, but also how intelligence activity is 
evaluated by academics. 
 
Leaving to one side for the time being the controversy that many intelligence 
operations cause quite properly once the public get to hear about them, it is vital to 
understand that in the UK it has to do with secret information, as the British 
government puts it: ‘information acquired against the wishes and generally without 
the knowledge of the originators or possessors. Sources are kept secret from readers 
as are the techniques used to acquire the information (UK Government: MI5). 
In the USA, on the other hand, ‘intelligence’ is generally held to be any information, 
secret and open source, that is passed to government and on which it may act.  
 
The fullest official description of the nature of intelligence as it is defined in the UK 
comes, paradoxically perhaps, from the Review carried out by Lord Butler into the 
intelligence failures that hallmarked Britain’s attack on Iraq in 2003, largely justified 
on intelligence indicating that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of WMD (published in 
the government’s 2002 dossier) which proved not to be the case (UK Government: 
Butler, 2004). 
‘Intelligence’ Lord Butler stated in his Review ‘merely provides techniques for 
improving the basis of knowledge…it can be a dangerous tool if its limitations are not 
recognized…the most important limitation is its incompleteness. Much ingenuity and 
effort is spent on making secret information difficult to acquire…it is often when first 
acquired sporadic and patchy and even after analysis may still be at best 
inferential…the necessary protective security procedures with which intelligence is 
handled can reinforce a mystique of omniscience. Intelligence is not only like many 
other sources incomplete, it can be incomplete in undetectable ways…A hidden 
limitation of intelligence is its inability to transform a mystery into a secret. In 
principle intelligence can be expected to uncover secrets…The enemy’s intentions 
may not be known but they are…knowable. But mysteries are essentially 
unknowable. What a leader truly believes or which his reactions would be in certain 
circumstances cannot be known but can only be judged. Joint Intelligence 
Committee judgements have to cover both secrets and mysteries…but [judgement] 
cannot impart certainty’ (UK Government: Butler, 2004). 
Secret, intelligence-led activity has been, is and will always be a key, and probably a 
core, tool of governance whether in the UK, the USA or indeed anywhere else. Lord 
Butler listed several examples of where secret intelligence had a positive and 
decisive influence on Britain’s security. If nothing else, they show the importance, 
breadth and the impact of intelligence on policy: ‘the compliance with international 
law or international treaties, warning of untoward events, support of military and 
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law enforcement operations and in long-term assistance to planning for future 
national security operations’(UK Government: Butler, 2004). Specific cases included 
the uncovering of the work of A Q Khan who was ‘at the centre of an international 
proliferation network’ in helping states to illegally enrich uranium, the decision by 
Libya to abandon its WMD programme in December 2003, the validation of the 
existence of Iran’s chemical weapons programme, of North Korea’s development of 
WMD, in the fight against Islamist terrorism and the tracking of ‘Usama Bin Laden’ 
since November 1998. 
There is a large literature the definition of intelligence and the nature of intelligence 
studies (Lowenthal, 1999). There is consensus that the subject must involve an 
investigation of intelligence activity, how governments utilise it and how, and in 
what circumstances, intelligence communities carry out their duties (Gill, Marrin and 
Phythian, 2008). It is obvious that the definition of intelligence must condition what 
is studied, both practically and conceptually. In a US context the subject would 
involve examining all information going to government in respect of any particular 
policy or event, whereas in the UK it ought, strictly, to mean the study of the use of 
secret information in policy-making (secret, that is, at the time of use). In the US 
context a massive number of government institutions would have to be looked at, in 
the UK the perspective would be limited to secret agencies and the national security 
policies associated with them.  
 
In the event, however, the different definitions carry implications that go far beyond 
what is studied and researched. They impact on what is taught but also on the 
conclusions that are drawn about intelligence activity more generally. It is not just 
the case that the subject is conceived much more narrowly in the USA, it is that 
some of those teaching it in the UK seem to wish to brush over the significant 
conceptual differences in order to emphasise (or exaggerate) what they regard as 
the commonalties between US and UK intelligence. Several UK academics in the field 
point to what they claim is an intelligence ‘Anglosphere’, even suggesting that we in 
the UK may be its ‘prisoners’ to which the comparison of diverse intelligence 
cultures on a global scale could be an antidote (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012).  
 
In making this argument, however, the authors take it as a given that this 
‘Anglosphere’ really exists and that it provides a firm basis for the study of the UK 
intelligence community, often quoting in support an influential practitioner turned 
scholar, Michael Herman (Herman, 1995). Herman believes he has identified a 
commonality between the USA and the UK of ‘dynamics and problems’. Elsewhere 
Herman has argued that (as Aldrich puts it) that ‘despite their marked differences in 
size, intelligence in Whitehall has more in common than with any cognate 
continental European mechanism’. This idea has formed the basis of several other 
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academic studies including a recent two volume comparative study (which ironically 
actually describes in careful detail the myriad differences between the two systems) 
(Davies, 2012). In fact the differences are far more important than the similarities 
and it is not at all clear what weight should be given to the concept of an 
‘Anglosphere’ in organisational (‘intelligence machinery’) or ethical and legal terms.  
 
Despite the difference in the concept of ‘intelligence’, there are also of course 
deeply significant historical differences between the two communities (Britain has a 
much older intelligence community with a much less sinister record), differences in 
the number of intelligence agencies (seventeen major ones in the US compared to 
just three major ones in the UK). The current intelligence concerns of the USA and 
the UK are very similar but these are surely the concerns of every other western 
intelligence community (and several non-western ones as well). Equally (and 
importantly) the methods used to yield intelligence are, as is discussed below, very 
similar even if the capacity of the USA to collect it far exceeds that of any other 
western state. Yet even this latter fact of commonality points to a further key 
distinction, not a similarity. To be fair to Herman, his argument relies largely on the 
fact that both intelligence systems are concerned to provide analytical reporting and 
estimates on national security issues (although it is hard to think of agencies 
anywhere who do not do this).  It is, of course, true that the ‘special relationship’ 
between the USA and the UK has at its heart the UKUSA intelligence-sharing 
agreements, hatched at Bletchley Park during the Second World War that give 
Britain much of its raw intelligence product as well as facilitating over the years (in a 
political sense) the purchase of state of the art US intelligence-gathering technology.  
 
However any dispassionate observer would be right to conclude that the differences 
between the two communities are indeed far more significant in every way than 
their similarities and arguably that the similarities between the UK intelligence 
community and that of cognate European countries, for example Germany or the 
Netherlands, are greater than the perception that there exist differences between 
them. Former practitioners, especially those charged with cooperating with US 
agencies may find it too easy to confuse cooperation with sameness, a common 
language with common values. Perhaps some academics may think the concept of 
an ‘Anglosphere’ in intelligence is useful for another reason: to tar both intelligence 
communities with the same negative brush. Given the many failures and abuses 
hitherto endemic in the myriad of US intelligence agencies but particularly in the FBI 
and the CIA, it is intellectually only too easy to transfer on British (and ‘cognate 
European agencies’) the necessary criticism of American ones, along the lines that 
(to put it crudely) ‘if the American agencies use torture, then we must do so too’ 
rather than ask, perhaps, why it is that the story of America’s intelligence community 
is, on the whole, such an unhappy one. This is a point to which we return. However, 
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with an emphasis on reporting and assessment, it is plain that those teaching the 
subject will have more than a passing concern with the teaching of analytical skills. 
 
Precisely because intelligence has become such an important input into policy-
making it could be claimed that all students of governance, politics and international 
affairs should understand it. However, the materials that are studied, whether in 
respect of the USA, the UK or any other democratic state, and where current 
political or military matters are concerned, will, by definition, be largely inaccessible, 
even, in the case of the UK, at the time of their use, totally secret; where they these 
matters lie in the past (and are history) it is possible that what was secret will today 
be known about. Historical intelligence documents are frequently destroyed and 
where intelligence failures have generated public inquiries of various kinds, 
definitive or complete evidence may not be rendered to them by governments (UK 
Government: Security and Intelligence Committee Annual Reports).1 This is a major 
problem for intelligence studies where the subject is oriented towards policy and 
policy-making, although the attack on Iraq in 2003, for example, produced six 
inquiries most publishing important secret documentation (the sixth, the Chilcot 
Report, still awaits publication at the time of writing) but to date none have perhaps 
provided entirely convincing evidence to explain fully how war came.  
 
In historical terms, the possibilities for the academic study of intelligence-led activity 
in the UK are, however, now immeasurably greater than they have ever been before. 
This is not least because of the publication of official or authorized histories of the 
secret agencies, partly because there is now a vast amount of secret material in the 
public domain, as releases to the National Archive, directly and via publishing 
ventures attest (e.g a current 2015 Taylor and Francis project). It is possible, of 
course, to entertain serious reservations about the way that authorized or semi-
official histories have been given by the agencies to specific historians (one preferred 
historian received three major commissions) and deciding ultimately what should or 
should be published. Interesting, the German intelligence service, the BND, has dealt 
with this matter very differently: it has appointed a committee of a dozen 
independent historians and researchers, allowed them free access to the BND’s files 
and to research what they will (the first publications have shown the early, post-
                                                        
1 MI5 told Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee that BY 1998 it had destroyed 110,000 of 
its files on extremist subversion in the UK because it no longer worked on subversion (whilst the files 
will have related to Communist and Fascist subversion it remains the case, according to its website, 
that MI5 does not concern itself with subversion of any kind). The 1989 Act establishing MI5, the 
Security Service, in statute, does, in fact, lay on it an obligation to counter actions ‘intended to 
overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’; however, a simple 
‘intention’ to do so would today not arouse MI5’s interest: there would have to be clear evidence of a 
‘capability’ of doing so and this would be defined in terms of weapons or explosives, not in terms of 
political pressure or extremist activity per se. 
 7 
1945 BND in an unfavourable light) (Federal Republic of Germany: 
Bundesnachrichtendienst).   
 
In a significant article on the development of intelligence studies within the 
university systems of the west, published in 2009, the doyen of Canadian intelligence 
studies, Martin Rudner, noted that prior to the 1990s whilst some intelligence-
related topics were being taught at various universities in the USA, the UK, Canada, 
Germany and Israel ‘most academic programmes eschewed any reference to 
intelligence topics’ (Rudner, 2009). He suggested that the reasons for this may have 
been ‘the secrecy attached to intelligence matters, or the reluctance of academe to 
engage with clandestine services – or the fear of being subverted by secret 
organisations’. Nevertheless by 1985 there were over fifty courses on intelligence 
subjects being taught in US universities; it was in this year that two important 
journals on intelligence were launched (Intelligence and National Security and The 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence). 
 
The number of intelligence studies programmes increased in the next decade 
triggered in the UK by the emergence of a scholarly literature on the history of 
intelligence issues (the first the revelations about British intelligence successes in the 
Second World War had appeared in the mid-1970s), and in both the UK and the USA 
growing public concern at what seemed like a catalogue of intelligence failures and 
scandals. In the USA, the intelligence community undoubtedly embraced this 
interest, seeing, perhaps, a means of restoring its bruised reputation whereas in the 
UK the secret agencies remained resolutely secret. By 1993 the CIA, significantly, was 
even happy to convene a symposium on teaching intelligence in universities and ten 
years later the US Defense Intelligence Agency began to compile a list of university 
programmes it considered were ‘committed to excellence in defence of the nation’, 
implying that what they were doing was of value to the USA’s intelligence 
community and that graduates from these departments might well get government 
jobs in the field.  
 
One might have thought that 9/11 had produced would have led to led a 
proliferation of intelligence studies programmes throughout the western world. 
After all, whatever else it was, it was a massive intelligence failure on the part of the 
US and all other western intelligence communities requiring proper scrutiny of the 
profession of intelligence and its effectiveness, and better educated intelligence 
professionals. In the event this did not really happen. Rudner points out that ‘whilst 
9/11 catapulted [this subject] to the forefront of international relations, universities 
were inexplicably tardy in developing academic programmes’ to explore its 
implications. By the 2000s there were ‘still only a few dedicated departments of 
intelligence studies’ rather than departments who offered this module or that on an 
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intelligence-related subject. Whilst the latter could be found in the universities of all 
western states, this continued to be in the form of modules within other fields of 
studies, whether international relations, history, political science. 
 
Today actual degrees in intelligence studies, whether at undergraduate or 
postgraduate level, are in fact very few in number: about six in the USA, including 
the offer of the National Intelligence University (which describes itself as ‘the [US] 
intelligence community’s sole accredited federal degree granting institution’) and 
the Ridge Center at Mercyhurst University (The Ridge Center, 2015). However, very 
many universities offer modules on intelligence studies, usually in conjunction with 
international studies of one form or another. Very few teachers of the subject are 
tenured academic staff, a point to which we return. 
 
Interestingly, the position of intelligence studies in the Federal Republic of Germany 
was uniquely different not least because of the appalling role that intelligence 
agencies had played in contemporary German history and politics (Scott and Jackson, 
2008). The legacy left by the Gestapo on the one hand and the Stasi on the other 
meant (perversely one might think) thinking Germans wished to know as little as 
possible about intelligence-led activity and wanted it to play as small a role in their 
democracy as was feasible. Wolfgang Krieger, who used to be Germany’s only 
professor of intelligence history (now emeritus), described it more than once as ‘a 
field in search of scholars’. Yet perhaps surprisingly the German secret intelligence 
service, the BND, is today at the forefront both of promoting a scholarly interest in 
the subject and also not just teaching the subject internally but supporting outreach 
activity to a few British universities (Federal Republic of Germany: 
Bundesnachrichtendienst, 2015 ). 
 
 
Why Study Intelligence? ‘Training’ versus ‘Education’ 
 
Having looked at what intelligence means when in conjunction with its study, a word 
on its teaching. The big divide is between those who see the subject as offering a 
broad ‘education’ in the nature of intelligence activity, and those who believe an 
intelligence degree should, largely and perhaps exclusively, consist of ‘training’ 
students to be intelligence officers (which, as we shall see, in fact means teaching 
students intelligence analysis, not how to be covert operatives which would be 
illegal). Once again, there is a revealing paradox between the UK and the USA, the 
two countries, as we have seen, that have most intelligence studies programmes: in 
the UK where the definition of intelligence ought to be very narrow, its study tends 
to be a broad one whereas in the USA, where its study should be broad in scope, it is 
often extremely narrow. This may come from the fact that the British intelligence 
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community believes that whilst it might be useful to them if some of their 
intelligence officers had degrees in intelligence studies, there is no particular reason 
why they should. Those, on the other hand, chiefly in the USA who push for 
intelligence ‘training’ plainly encourage students wanting to work for the US 
intelligence community to believe that it is ‘intelligence training’ the US intelligence 
community is chiefly focused on when recruiting, something some US agencies seem 
to encourage. 
 
Consequently, most US departments of intelligence build their pitch to prospective 
students on the market for graduate analysts. There are said to be about 300-
500,000 intelligence analysts working for the various US agencies and their 
contractors (the precise number seems to be secret). It is hard to quantify the 
precise number of intelligence analysts in the UK but we know that in 2012 our 
secret agencies employed 13,293 officers. If we add to these intelligence analysts 
working for the JIC and government departments such as the Ministry of Defence 
and the little known Defence, Science, Technology Laboratory it seems likely that 
there are about 30,000 intelligence analyst posts in the UK at the moment (UK 
Government: Organisations, 2015). Probably no more than hundred of these, at 
most, will have had any degree level intelligence qualification (own estimate). There 
are currently 3,638 vacant intelligence analyst posts including for the secret agencies 
and the UK police services on offer through one jobs portal (Indeed, 2015). 
 
It is hardly surprising that in the USA, some universities should have seen a business 
opportunity staring them in the face, linking job prospects and fees. One of them, 
James Madison University, makes its pitch for them as follows: ‘the concept for [our] 
intelligence analysis degree program was developed in 2002 when [our] faculty 
began working with industry and government agencies […] to emphasize critical 
thinking, skills, pattern matching, data fusion, technical writing and creating 
intelligence from existing data’(JMU, 2015). A noted instructor there, Stephen 
Marrin, writes about his own work that his ‘recent project is to understand and 
improve intelligence analysis by learning from other disciplines such as the social 
sciences, history, anthropology and journalism’. The Institute for Intelligence Studies 
at Mercyhurst University explains that its goal ‘is to produce a graduate who is 
qualified to be an entry level analyst for the government and the private sector’. 
Whilst intelligence analysis is a core subject both in the USA and the UK, there is 
much evidence to show that in many, perhaps most, US universities it is the core 
subject. It is seen as a skill the acquisition of which can be monetized.  
 
Whilst offering students a training in intelligence analysis as if it were an education 
in intelligence studies might seem attractive, given the market for intelligence 
analysts (which is almost certainly expanding, and deserves to be), it is, without 
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doubt, the wrong thing to do. Without intellectual depth, the subject has no 
purchase on the academy or on society more generally, the urgency in policy, 
pedagogical (and moral) terms is wholly removed. What is more, it is not clear that 
the market truly wants this either. Why would a student want to spend three years 
as an undergraduate being narrowly trained as an analyst (or one year if a 
postgraduate) to get an entry-level job in an organisation as an analyst where 
training is part of the job? Why would British secret agencies, at any rate, recruit 
good graduates of any discipline (who are then given in-house training) if it made 
more sense to specify that it would only accept candidates who had been trained in 
intelligence analysis at university? The answer is not hard to work out. Good analysts 
need broad minds not narrow ones. 
 
Teaching intelligence analysis at universities certainly provides work for retired 
analysts (in the USA, unlike the UK, most intelligence teaching is done by former 
intelligence analysts, usually it seems from an FBI background). Website evidence 
indicates that only a small number of intelligence teachers are tenured academics 
and so unlikely to be able to play a formative role in their institutions or in how their 
subject can be developed in the academy. It is also likely to be true that if those 
delivering intelligence training are chiefly or exclusively former practitioners they 
are, unless they themselves have benefited from a broad academic education, likely 
to pass on to the next generations of analysts the flaws or errors in their own 
analytical skills, not to mention their own lack of a deeper understanding of 
international affairs and how these might impact on their homelands. As we shall 
see, one important reason for emphasising the research-led academic input into 
intelligence studies is precisely because it is from here that new insights and 
practices for intelligence agencies are most likely to emanate. Few institutions fail to 
benefit from that long and critical look from the outside.  
 
In the UK, degrees in intelligence can be obtained at about half a dozen universities 
although here the emphasis is much more on ‘education’ rather than ‘training’. 
Intelligence history is well-developed most notably at Cambridge University (but not, 
interestingly, at Oxford: here there is neither formalised intelligence history nor 
politics research and teaching although the ‘Oxford Intelligence Group’, not 
connected to the University but to one of its college makes a major contribution to 
the subject generally (Nuffield College, Oxford, 2015). This is partly because many UK 
universities balk at the very idea that universities should ‘train’ their students, partly 
because the market for graduate intelligence analysts is still undeveloped. 
 
However, even in the UK there are signs that things are changing. There will be a 
demand for more intelligence analysts especially for the police services as the 
number of officers continues to decline and intelligence-led policing becomes 
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increasingly important. Mercyhurst College and Lockheed Martin have teamed up to 
promote a US style intelligence analysis programme in Dungarvan in the Republic of 
Ireland which seeks to pull in British students and personnel from the police and 
armed services from throughout the European Union. Most of the training is 
apparently provided by former middle-ranking FBI practitioners (Mercyhurst 
University, 2015). 
 
There are other indications that training rather than education is gaining ground in 
the UK. Training analysts without degrees is cheaper than hiring graduates whether 
in intelligence studies or any other subject. In the second half of 2012, for example, 
the British media gave prominence to a new ‘apprenticeship scheme’ as a trawl for 
recruits to our secret agencies (the Government’s Communications Centre, GCHQ, 
was both the prime mover and intended chief beneficiary) (Channel Four News, 
2012). The implication is that at a time when cyberspace is both a growing threat to 
national security but also a key source of intelligence about that threat, eighteen 
year old ‘geeks’ who play computer games and know a thing or two about cyber 
hacking may make better officers than brilliant students of ancient Greek.  
 
A note written by a US intelligence analyst on whether a degree in intelligence 
analysis is worth having seems compelling at this point: he tells aspiring analysts that 
there is no point in doing an undergraduate degree because being an analyst is a 
‘practice’ that should best be learned on the job (Mathew Burton Org, 2015). Whilst 
research is a skill, he says, which can be taught, it can be acquired in many different 
disciplines (Richards, 2010). The purpose of intelligence studies, Rudner argues is 
‘certainly not to provide training [my emphasis] in actual intelligence tradecraft. That 
is something best left to the national intelligence and security community 
itself’(Rudner, 2009). Rather, he suggested, its aims were ‘to contribute to the 
building of public knowledge about the mandates, strategies, structures and 
functioning of intelligence organisations in statecraft, historically and 
contemporaneously […] and to educate students about [these] matters whether 
they are seeking careers in the intelligence community [or elsewhere]’. At the same 
time he conceded that whilst ‘in the past intelligence services were uneasy about 
research inquiries into their secretive domains…today academic research is 
recognised as contributing…to broader governmental and public knowledge…and 
might even be of value [to] the community itself for developing strategies and 
activities…improving operational capabilities especially in the domain of intelligence 
analysis [and] community outreach’. 
 
One could argue that the opposition of ‘education’ and ‘training’ goes to the heart of 
questions about the relevance of higher education. Bearing in mind that asking 
Google what is the purpose of a university brings up 893 million hits, there is unlikely 
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to be any consensus on whether in general it is, or should be, ‘training’ or 
‘education’. Some years ago, the then Vice Chancellor of Brunel University, Steven 
Schwartz said that even in a university originally established as a university of 
technology, higher education should eschew a simple training role, noting with 
approval a comment made in 1975 by the US educationist Harlan Cleveland (‘the 
outsiders want students trained for their first job out of university, and the 
academics inside the system want students educated for 50 years of self-fulfilment’) 
(Schwartz, 2003). 
 
What is plain is that without elements of tradecraft (that include intelligence analysis 
training), any intelligence studies programme will be seen as less than complete, it 
follows that pushing training without an education is a serious waste of an 
opportunity to extend understanding of intelligence matters. What is more, and this 
is perhaps extremely serious, concerning, there may well be a connection between 
the failures and excesses of the US intelligence community and the lack of a genuine 
broadly based education of the part of those who work within it. If ‘training’ 
becomes the core requirement of intelligence analysts, then those who acquire it 
run the risk of becoming ‘trained’, that is, doing the very thing they should not be 
doing, ticking boxes, obeying superior orders without question and oblivious to the 
fact that professional intelligence activity in a democracy demands high standards of 
judgement and ethics.  
 
 
Ethics, Surveillance and Academic Freedom 
 
Secret intelligence-led activity is an ever more dangerous world is an increasingly 
important part of modern governance. Yet in the UK it is, at the time it is employed, 
always a secret function of government and in the USA frequently secret, and 
precisely for this reason it is one that is always under close investigation by the 
media. It is also often under attack, especially from the media not unreasonably, 
often for alleged ethical failings sometimes severe. As has been argued, the US 
intelligence community has indeed got plenty to answer for and British intelligence 
has chalked up its own failures, albeit significantly if arguably mostly less wicked. But 
in Britain over the past decade, some parts of the media have displayed both an 
ignorance of UK intelligence activity and of the real progress made by the UK 
intelligence community towards greater openness and lawfulness. Bad practice on 
the part of our US allies has almost certainly shaped our attitudes towards our own 
community, often based on absurd ignorance. Yet now is not a good time to be 
unknowing, either for government or the public.  
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Intelligence studies should certainly contribute to public understanding of the ethics 
of intelligence activity (especially in respect of the observance of human rights) and 
to the social implications of the interception or non-interception of communications 
by intelligence agencies (Rudner, 2009).  
 
On the whole, anecdotal evidence suggests that most university intelligence 
departments and teachers are instinctively, as it were, suspicious of any secret 
activity conducted by their own government; there is also a case that could be made 
anecdotally that most academics are left-leaning, or even of the left, and that they 
associate (again instinctively) intelligence services with secret police and Gestapo. 
Just as there were few books in university libraries at the time the Soviet Union 
collapsed about how communist regimes could be turned into capitalist and liberal 
ones, but many volumes about how this might work the other way round, one is 
likely to find in those libraries today very many more hostile critiques of intelligence-
led activity, and policy, than broadly supportive and less critical texts (Tsang, 2007). 
However, and this is the important point, not only is academic dissent an important 
part of genuine academic freedom but it so often leads, automatically, to wider 
public debate. 
 
But apart from ensuring the issues are debated and aired, academic intelligence 
study is a form of record-keeping and in a time when people are deluged with 
electronic data about this or that, it also serves to preserve the collective memory of 
what really happens and happened.  
 
The ethical aspects of the use of torture to acquire intelligence are a revealing 
example of this. It is one thing to spell out why torture is likely always to be 
unacceptable (on the grounds that even if it produces actionable intelligence, it cuts 
against the grain of western ethics in general) but another to be able to 
demonstrate, with hard evidence, that it does huge and specific political damage to 
those regimes that use it. There is a critical distinction here between an act of 
torture carried out by an individual intelligence officer, perhaps under great 
pressure, and the deliberate, systematised, and authorised torture that a state can 
engage in. An understanding of the latter, however, is based on collective memory 
and the academic record. It is in academic circles that the issue has been most 
persistently discussed, and in academic writing that the fundamental facts can be 
found, are analysed and kept alive. 
 
Intelligence and Torture: An Academic Perspective 
 
The ethics of western intelligence agencies do not merely cause understandable 
public concern, they are one of the most important areas to which academic studies 
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of intelligence can add value as well as remind intelligence officers what is at stake 
here. British intelligence studies have concerned themselves with the issue 
extensively (Newbery, 2015). 
 
In February 2010 The Guardian had reported that the then Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Neuberger, one of Britain’s most senior judges had accused the British Security 
Service, MI5, of being ‘devious, dishonest and complicit in torture’ (The Guardian, 
2010). The case related to a British resident (but Ethiopian national), Binyam 
Mohamed, who had been seized by US forces in Afghanistan after 2005 and held 
prisoner in Guantanamo Bay. Mohamed sued the British government, claiming he 
had been tortured by the Americans. The heads of MI5 and MI6, both denied their 
services used torture themselves (Evans, Sawers, 2010). 
 
What academic analysis added to the discussion was clarification of the charges 
made (the use of torture and unethical behaviour by American and the complicity of 
British intelligence) and a neutral space to reflect on them. Out of a scenario where 
both the USA and the UK were widely seen as both being torturers, a more refined 
picture emerged in respect of the claims against Britain (despite Lord Neuberger’s 
comments) (BBC News, 2010). This was a difficult thing to say about a very difficult 
subject. Ordinary people might think Evans and Sawers were either lying, or covering 
up their wickedness and conclude that British intelligence did indeed approve of the 
use of torture.  
Certainly, the academic study of intelligence could highlight the fact that the British 
approach to the use of torture and the deriving of intelligence from human sources 
was different from that of the Bush White House. Here the infamous White House 
memo of 25 January 2002 allowed US interrogators ‘to inflict pain and suffering up 
to the level of organ failure’ but not beyond it, thereby defining torture as ‘the 
experience of intense pain or suffering equivalent to serious physical injury, so 
severe that death, organ failure or permanent damage will likely result’ but anything 
less than this as not being torture (US Government, The White House, 2002). The 
result was the use of waterboarding and other measures which may not have been 
torture in the eyes of the White House but certainly were as far as objective 
academic analysis was concerned (in addition to water-boarding in April 2003 the 
Pentagon approved ‘slaps to the face and stomach and fear of dogs’; another 
prisoner was stripped naked, straddled by taunting female guards, threatened by 
dogs, placed on a leash, forced to bark like a dog and refused sleep for three days’.  
It would have been easy without academic investigation to have either damned both 
US and UK intelligence services or to have damned neither of them, either to 
underscore the belief that all intelligence services are basically secret police forces 
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who abuse human rights, or regard as perfectly proper human rights abuses that are 
committed by intelligence agencies (The European Convention on Human Rights, 
1950). Both choices would be quite wrong and unreflective. We need intelligence 
services but we need them to act lawfully and in accordance with human rights, not 
against them. This is a weighty case to be made in the academy, and through the 
academy to the outside world. It is not one just for politicians or journalists. The 
grave damage done not just to the US intelligence community but to the United 
States and the western way of life because of the serious mistakes made after 9/11 
are actually a matter of record. In an interview in February 2011 with The Sunday 
Times in order to advertise his book (Known and Unknown), Donald Rumsfeld 
himself twice addressed the issue of torture (Rumsfeld, 2011). First, in response to 
an admittedly leading question (‘why is America now so widely hated in the Middle 
East?’), he replied ‘there’s no question that the photographs from Abu Ghraib, the 
abuse of these people in American custody, harmed our country, harmed our 
military, and gave encouragement to the terrorists’. He added that he had offered 
his resignation to President George W. Bush when the story broke in 2004.  
 
The academic study of intelligence can add to the dismal story of US intelligence 
activity in recent times by pointing out that government-sanctioned torture was the 
stock in trade of some of the worst regimes the world had seen in modern times of 
which the Third Reich was a prime example. A document dated 12 June 1944 sent by 
SS-Gruppenführer Heinrich Müller, chief of the Gestapo (Secret Police), to all his 
officers makes it crystal clear that ‘harsh (that is, ‘enhanced’) interrogation’ is 
allowed and encouraged by the Nazi state (NS-Documentation Centre, Cologne). This 
is defined here as depriving the detainee of bread and water, a mattress, light, and 
sleep; ordering stress exercising; and, finally, beating with a stick to a maximum of 
twenty strokes. Two officers must always be present when the beatings take place. 
Where more than twenty strokes are given, the presence of a medical doctor is 
required.  
Müller adds that harsh interrogation is to be used only when the detainee refuses to 
divulge information relating to important matters of state or potential treason and 
only against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, 
resisters, enemy agents, social misfits, and ‘work-shy’ Poles and Soviet Russians 
(Jews, it should be added, were subject to special measures not covered in this 
document). For good measure, and to seem lawful, Mueller added that where 
torture had been used, and the detainee was brought before a court, the judges in 
the case were to be (secretly) informed that this has taken place.  The themes that 
jump out at the scholar here are only too significant: secrecy, detention, torture and 
pseudo-legal codification, also in secret. It is plain this has to be the stuff of any 
intelligence education worth the name. 
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The Snowden Revelations 
A further key area of academic intelligence studies has been, and will be, to 
investigate and assess the revelations made, in particular, by Edward Snowden in 
The Guardian and The New York Times in 2013 and subsequently. Snowden has self-
evidently caused all western governments and their intelligence agencies acute 
problems. The NSA and GCHQ are tasked with uncovering the secrets of our enemies 
and potential enemies. Snowden’s secrets had to do with the intentions and 
capabilities of the NSA, GCHQ and the BND themselves, to name but three agencies. 
The damage done by Snowden did not just come from the publication of secret 
material but from his making it clear that electronically transmitted communications 
on mobile phones or via the internet could be intercepted, collected, decrypted and 
acted upon if necessary.  
 
On the one hand, the public was bombarded by the media and influential British 
opinion formers, inside and outside parliament, claiming that every citizen was now 
under constant surveillance and that a great wrong was being perpetrated (Danchev, 
2015). On the other, the secret agencies publicly insisted this was quite untrue  
(Parker, Lobban, 2013). Even informed public opinion found it hard to form a 
judgement but, yet again, this difficulty highlighted the importance of the academic 
scrutiny of intelligence activity and the provision of more objective voices being 
heard. 
 
Evidence that the revelations made by Snowden, and before him Assange, and what 
the media and public opinion have done with them, had made the work of 
intelligence agencies very much harder was serious and compelling. Professor Sir 
David Omand said Snowden’s revelations had caused ‘the most catastrophic loss to 
British intelligence ever’ (Omand, 2013). His conclusion, however, was discounted by 
some commentators on the grounds that he had been the security and intelligence 
coordinator for Tony Blair’s government at the time of the attack on Iraq and, before 
that, a director of GCHQ. Yet academic support for his case could be found (Glees, 
2013). Indeed, the harm to intelligence had been done in part because Snowden had 
drawn the attention of Islamists (and serious organised criminals such as people 
traffickers and drug smugglers) to the fact that their electronic communications 
could be intercepted and decoded by the NSA, GCHQ and the BND and other 
agencies. The result, not surprisingly was that the use of such communications by 
these people declined sharply: as the head of MI5 put it ‘it causes enormous damage 
to make public the reach and limits of GCHQ techniques’ (The Daily Telegraph, 2013; 
CNN Security Blog, 2013). 
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But a different kind of damage had also been caused. Media reporting had, on the 
whole, attempted (and with considerable success) to give the thinking public the 
impression not only that everyone was under surveillance all the time but unlawfully 
so, implying there was a secret police at work ‘snooping’ on everyone. There may 
have been some mischievous intent at work but it is also the case that the issue was, 
on one level, very complicated, and revolved around the fact that vast numbers of 
people were now communicating with each other in an electronic format. What 
agencies had previously done (and done secretly), involving a comparatively small 
number of communications, was now very widely known about and, given the IT 
revolution, could be done with greater numbers of them. Telling everyone they were 
being spied on was a much better story than saying only a comparatively few very 
dangerous people were under genuine surveillance. 
 
The opinion-formers had a field day. Graeme Archer in The Daily Telegraph wrote 
‘What right does the state have to snoop on the lives of others?’(Archer, 2013). Al 
Gore opined that ‘evidence of secret blanket surveillance [sic] is obscenely 
outrageous’ (Gore, 2013). Jonathan Freedland in The Guardian said ‘the secret state 
is just itching to gag the press’ (Freedland, 2013). Sir Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of 
the web, claimed that allowing agencies to mine data (which is what was in effect 
going on as Snowden made clear the following year) would lead to ‘the destruction 
of human rights’ (Berners-Lee, 2012). In respect of new laws requiring ISPs to make 
more data available to secret agencies, quickly dubbed ‘the snoopers’ charter’ (as if 
intelligence were ‘snooping’ rather than ‘investigation’) Dominic Raab, a prominent 
Tory MP, insisted ‘these plans will allow state snoopers to drain the swamp with 
powers that are broad and vague and invite abuse (Raab, 2012). All this reinforced 
the earlier misgiving about intelligence activity following on from the use of 
intelligence to justify the attack on Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent allegations of 
torture. The spy novelist John le Carre had already gone on record to say that he, for 
one, was ‘deeply dismayed by the performance of our intelligence services, who are 
alienated from government’ (le Carre, 2011).  
 
Glenn Beck the US radio journalist put it this way: ‘they’ve been tracking your 
purchases, and your credit card activity, they’ve been capturing your phone 
conversations. They have your whole life’ (Beck, 2013). Shami Chakrabati, chair of 
‘Liberty’, the civil liberties pressure group, launched one of several attacks in the 
media on intelligence work (but before and after Snowden) which she claimed was 
constructing ‘the snooping state’ (Chakrabati, 2012). She said ‘mass monitoring, the 
Data Communications Bill, would allow the state to record and store the entire 
population’s web visits, emails, text messages and phone calls – for no other reason 
than the authorities’ possible future interest’ (the headline put it starkly ‘the state 
 18 
wants to spy on you in your home’). This would be, she insisted, like having the 
‘thought police on permanent duty in their homes’. 
 
Set against these views, there were the statements of the heads of Britain’s secret 
agencies who naturally took a different line. Andrew Parker the head of MI5 said 
publicly in October 2013 ‘the idea that we either can or want to operate intensive 
scrutiny of thousands of people is fanciful. This is not East Germany....’. The next 
month he said: ‘The raison d’etre of MI5 is to protect the sort of country we live in 
against threats to it...We live in a free society, a democracy where we prize our 
individual liberty and privacy. These values are extremely important to all of the men 
and women who work in our agencies...they don’t want to live in a surveillant 
society’ (Parker, 2013). Sir Iain Lobban, then head of GCHQ, put it no less 
emphatically: ‘We do not spend our time listening to the telephone calls or reading 
the emails of the vast majority. That would not be proportionate, that would not be 
legal. We do not do it. I don’t employ people who would do it. If they were asked to 
snoop I would not have the work force. They would leave the building’. His service 
also made a rare statement (‘we do not target anyone indiscriminately ...our 
activities are proportionate to the threats we face, and we follow the law 
meticulously’) (Lobban, 2013). 
 
However, the point is that large swathes of the media and politicians (most 
interestingly, perhaps, from the right and the far left and Greens, but not from the 
moderate left) plainly did not believe the intelligence chiefs. And this happened, to 
an extent that seems absurd, despite the facts in respect of the realities of 
interception and data mining and what should have been the reasonable assertion 
that gaining intelligence about jihadist terrorism, one of the NSA’s and GCHQ’s key 
duties, did not threaten liberties but protected them. Asked by Parliament’s 
Intelligence and Security Committee in the autumn of 2014 whether she would 
oppose the bulk collection of electronic data even if it provided evidence of terrorist 
activity, Isabella Sankey of Liberty said ‘absolutely’ (Sankey, 2014). Asked if ‘you 
believe so strongly that bulk interception is unacceptable in a free society that you 
would say it was a price we should be willing to pay rather than allowing agencies to 
use bulk interception’ she replied ‘Yes…that is the price you pay for a free society’. 
 
The thought that the price that is paid for a free society is an attack on that freedom 
is as absurd as the argument that doing so was ‘giving the terrorists the very thing 
they wanted’ or ‘doing the terrorists’ work for them’.  Making democracy resilient is 
surely the last thing they would want. But the point, again, is that the only way of 
exploring issues like these in any reflective depth is via sober, objective and 
independent academic scrutiny. 
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What academic departments could point out was that for more than 100 years the 
communications of Britain’s enemies and potential enemies had been regularly 
intercepted and, where possible, decoded and acted upon. With the development of 
the internet and the massive increase in the use of mobile phones, the number of 
wireless communications had also grown exponentially (about 50% of the world’s 
7bn people now use mobile phones, they send each other 300bn emails each day; 
perhaps 10,000 text messages are sent in the UK every second) (International 
Business Times, 2014). Modern software allowed a very large number of 
communications to be collected, and some of them to be mined for intelligence. This 
was not ‘mass surveillance’ even if it was the mass collection of data. Words matter 
and no one knows this better than academics. ‘Surveillance’ implies ‘being 
observed’: when undertaken by intelligence officers, it means being observed on a 
twenty-four hour basis. This is self-evidently not happening. 
 
Oddly enough, Snowden himself did not actually allege that everyone was under 
‘surveillance’ and did not (as far as one call tell) imply this until 2014. The mass 
surveillance claim was made in particular by The Guardian in its headlines and its 
editorial writing (perhaps to justify that somewhere it did understand that it had put 
national security at risk and so needed something very serious indeed to justify what 
it had done). Snowden showed there had been bulk collection of data and has 
always been vague on whether or not this constituted actual surveillance (arguably 
because he knew that it did not).  
 
On 17 June 2013 in a piece written up by Glenn Greenwald for The Guardian 
Snowden did say, apparently, that his documents had revealed 'the largest 
programme of suspicionless surveillance in human history' (Greenwald, 2013). Again 
on 3 May 2014 in another Guardian story (headlined 'Everyone Is Under Surveillance 
Now') we were told that in a video for a debate in Canada Snowden had said 'It's no 
longer based on the traditional practice of targeted traps based on some individual 
suspicion of wrongdoing. It covers phone calls, emails, search history, what you buy, 
who your friends are, where you go, who you love' (Snowden, 2014). 
 
Whilst the software programme Snowden revealed may be large and therefore 
logically it follows that its use could lead to the surveillance of large numbers of 
people (because extremely large numbers of people use the internet or send 
wireless messages to each other), it is not 'suspicionless' surveillance because there 
must be a suspicion for true surveillance to be triggered – without suspicion the 
state breaks the law. Snowden himself, it should be stressed, does not actually say 
that ‘everyone is under surveillance’. Furthermore Snowden's own words ('It's no 
longer based...') can be understood to mean this would be a definition of 'mass 
surveillance' if the 'you' were everyone rather than someone. Nor is it clear what the 
'It's' refers to, whether he means ‘collection’ or ‘surveillance’ (the debate to which 
he was contributing was concerned with by ‘surveillance’ we in fact mean ‘mass 
surveillance’).  
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It is simply not true that every intercepted communication was read by an 
intelligence officer (whether in the US, the UK or Germany) and in a philosophical 
sense this activity is hardly new. After all, the work undertaken at Bletchley Park 
during the Second World War was widely regarded as perhaps Britain’s greatest 
intelligence success. None of this had made Britain less free. Rather the opposite: in 
helping to resist the Third Reich, Soviet Communism and now Islamism, interception 
had sustained liberty. What is more, adherence to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and an insistence that intelligence activity be lawful, accountable to 
parliament and the public, if anything citizens should be less anxious about the 
existence of secret agencies today than ever before, when none of the kind existed.  
 
Two years on from Snowden, the debate about his revelations still rages. To date no 
evidence has been adduced by his revelations (or those of Julian Assange) that any 
major infringement of any law has taken place in Britain (or the United States), 
nothing has suggested there has been unlawful intelligence activity. It is true that in 
the case of Germany (for historical reasons it is indeed a special case) there is 
evidence that Snowden revealed that specific German laws were broken either by 
the NSA or the BND but the price paid for any public good in uncovering a particular 
set of issues in relation to Germany has been totally exorbitant in terms of the 
assistance Snowden’s revelations have given to the mortal foes of liberal democracy, 
both in evading detection via the best possible means for doing so (namely the 
interception of their communications) and in causing intelligence agencies to be 
portrayed as the enemies of a free society, rather than its protectors (CNN, 2015). 
 
This is not to suggest that the debate about the implications of contemporary 
intelligence collection and analysis should be stifled (even if it were possible which it 
patently is not). It is not far-fetched to believe that just as the possession of nuclear 
weapons (which, after 1945, could never be used) came to define what was, and was 
not, a major world power, so today the possession of intelligence (and information 
more generally) may come to serve the same function. Certainly, in the case of the 
USA, the vast quantities of information now being collected (but, we are assured, 
not analysed) would indicate that part of being the world’s superpower is having, at 
its disposal, as much of the world’s data as it is possible to intercept (Hertzberg, 
2013). 
 
The academic study of intelligence is (and ought to be) a space between public 
opinion and the practice of intelligence, able to give objective, research-led insights 
into what it does and whether it does so well, and lawfully. There are many further 
examples where an academic standpoint can and should play an important role in 
helping to infuse some objectivity and context to an otherwise dangerously 
confusing and polarised picture. It is of course the case that there is no settled 
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academic view on whether or not mass collection of electronically stored data, 
allowing some of it be decrypted and used as intelligence, constitutes ‘mass 
surveillance’ or whether if it does and it can be used to avoid violence and death, it is 
a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing. But it is academic study that will produce some answers. 
 
Public opinion is an important aspect of democratic government and winning the 
consent of the public to secret and intrusive operations is necessary if it is to take 
place. Without public support, security services will be reluctant to intervene to keep 
people safe. The irony is that polls suggest the public itself (at any rate the non-
Muslim public) is far less concerned about ‘surveillance’ than the media and the 
opinion formers inside and outside the British parliament. 71 per cent of those asked 
in one polls in February 2014 (some six months after the Snowden revelations) said 
they believed the government was justified in eroding their right to privacy in the 
pursuit of terrorists or serious criminals (YouGov, 2014; Cable, 2015). Only 29 per 
cent polled by YouGov believed their right to privacy should be a priority over efforts 
to track terrorism. 
 
If intelligence activity with public consent can keep us safe, the perception that the 
public, or at least the Muslim public, may withhold their consent is also true. The 
travel to the Islamic State of three British Muslim school girls (two aged 15 and one 
aged 16) from Bethnal Green Academy in London in Spring 2015 could almost 
certainly have been prevented if there had been better intelligence-led surveillance 
of these school students who, following the earlier departure to the Islamic State of 
one of their friends were very clearly at risk. We do not yet know why this 
surveillance did not occur but intelligence service anxiety about public opinion could 
well be one reason. 
 
 
 
Campus Radicalisation 
 
If we are to contain the current threats to our way of life without conflict, it will have 
to be achieved through the use of intelligence by our intelligence community 
including the police service who are increasing their reliance on intelligence activity. 
In respect of Islamism, intelligence has already been used successfully to disrupt 
plots against targets in the UK (for example the ‘Crevice’ chemical fertiliser plot in 
which students from Brunel University played a leading part, or the ‘Transatlantic 
Airliner Plot’ again involving British university students and graduates) (BBC, 2007; 
BBC, 2009). Intelligence allowed these conspiracies to be disrupted at any early 
stage. With sufficient public support and understanding, intelligence could also be 
used preventatively: to stop the process of radicalisation and prevent young British 
 22 
Muslims from turning to terrorism in the first place. There is, then, a direct link 
between the study of intelligence, promoting the effectiveness of lawful secret 
activity and the securing of democracy.  
 
Academic intelligence studies, therefore, have a third task. It is to underpin the 
moral and philosophical (rather than the technical) case for resisting the threats to 
our liberty by using intelligence studies within universities to reflect back onto the 
academy itself (Glees, 2014, 2009-10). If there is a moral obligation on intelligence 
departments to explain why torture is always unacceptable, why bulk data collection 
is not mass surveillance and therefore does not put our democratic way of life at 
risk, there is also a moral duty to alert the academy to the threats posed by the 
radicalisation of young British Muslims and their conversion to violent extremism 
either (depending on one’s view) from within higher education, or despite its taking 
place. Higher education plays a double role here: both as a critical space to examine 
this phenomenon and teach its students to avoid it but also as a space where 
radicalisation takes place.  
 
Those who have been through the process of higher and further education but have 
willingly turned to murderous and sadistic jihadism have plainly lost their moral 
compass. Whether it was during their time as students of higher and further 
education that they turned to terrorism, whether university life enabled their 
radicalisation and recruitment to take place, may be a matter for legitimate debate. 
However, it is incontrovertibly the case that whatever higher and further education 
may have done to set out a moral compass of decency for students to follow, it has, 
self-evidently, not been enough. There is a sin of omission here, even if there may be 
no sins of commission on the part of academics (the impact of visiting speakers on 
students’ thinking is another matter altogether). 
 
For a young British Muslim to go off to be a jihadist killer, or a sex-slave/jihadist 
bride, two things need to have happened. First they need to be radicalised. Then 
they need to be recruited. Radicalisation of young minds is primarily but not 
exclusively a matter of education. Education can prevent it from happening but it is 
also within sites of education, especially higher education that much of it takes 
place.  
 
The academy could (and probably should) even help make the moral case to reject 
violent and illiberal activity within them, usually using the camouflage of ‘free 
speech’ or ‘academic freedom’ to justify them. Islamist extremism, like any other 
form of revolutionary extremism, seeks to destroy the essential freedoms of the 
liberal state. Yet, fortified by an ignorance of intelligence on the one hand, and a 
refusal to see that in the UK intelligence activity is not about the lawless attack on 
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liberty that is sometimes claimed, many universities as liberal institutions find 
themselves in the parlous position of using liberal values (and institutions including 
universities themselves) to support entirely illiberal activity, whether it is the 
justification of violence as perpetrated by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or even 
of the gender segregation of Muslim student groups by Universities UK, since 
apparently rescinded (Dandridge, 2013). 
 
There is significant evidence to show that there is a direct link between higher 
education and Islamist extremism although the precise nature of that link awaits 
further research. A whole host of UK Islamist terrorists have been university 
students, from Mohammed Emwazi (aka ‘Jihadi John’) who had studied at 
Westminster University, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab at University College London, 
Michael Adelbalajo (who beheaded Lee Rigby) at Greenwich University and 
Mohammad Sidique Khan (the lead of the 7/7 London bombers) at Leeds 
Metropolitan University. Seifeddine Rezgui who murdered thirty British tourists in 
Tunisia was a student at a university in Kairouan. Statistics presented by the Minister 
for Security at the time, James Brokenshire MP, show that by 2015 some 40 per cent 
of those convicted of terrorism offences were either students or recent graduates in 
higher education. Statistics presented in 2011 to the parliamentary Home Affairs 
Select Committee gave the number of convicted terrorists with a higher or further 
education background as 45 per cent, of whom 10 per cent were students at the 
time the offences were committed (UK Government, 2012). It is not unsafe to infer 
that as many as many 55 per cent of those committing terrorist offences but not 
convicted come from a university background, perhaps more. This chimed with 
findings made about the position in the UK some five to ten years ago.  
 
One early study pointed out that campuses were likely to be one major site of 
extremism, radicalisation and recruitment (Glees and Pope, 2005). This conclusion 
not only pointed to an area of potential interest to the UK security community but 
raised the question as to what, if anything, universities were doing to act against 
radicalisation and extremism and why places of learning and free inquiry should in 
some way be supporting those who wanted to destroy liberal democracy. The 
argument was not that universities taught young British Muslims to become 
extremists and terrorists but that they did little or nothing to prevent this from 
happening (either by preventing campuses from being used as sites of radicalisation 
or by educating Muslim students to turn them away from terror). However an 
analysis of this kind was not welcomed by higher education authorities. Universities 
UK insisted at the time that ‘there was no evidence’ to connect ‘student radicals’ 
with violent extremism or that ‘speakers who are offensive to many people cause 
violent extremism in the student audience; there is no evidence of that’ (Dandridge, 
2011).  
 24 
 
A key paper published in 2007 took the argument further and in a different direction 
(Gambetta and Hertog, 2007). The authors pointed out not only that 69 per cent of a 
cohort of 326 jihadist terrorists, on whom there was biographical material, came 
from a higher education background but that 44 per cent were students of 
engineering. For Gambetta and Hertog it was as much the subject studied as the 
higher education background that was of significance. More research is needed to be 
sure that the subjects studied have any relevance (there is evidence to suggest that 
the subject studied may be of much greater significance in Middle Eastern and North 
African populations than in western Europe). But the two fundamental points would 
appear to stand: an important source of jihadists have a higher education 
background and for this reason this is a matter of pedagogical, security and more 
general social concern. Britain’s universities are perhaps still in denial about this. A 
2015 report claims, credibly, that in 2014 123 extremist Islamist speakers visited UK 
campuses and more than 20 students were convicted of terrorist related offences in 
connection with seeking to join IS fighters in Syria and Iraq (The Daily Mail, 2015). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Britain faces an increasingly serious problem of radicalisation on the one hand, and a 
security community that is finding it increasingly hard to contain it. Currently 
intelligence-led activity is almost wholly focused on disrupting the recruiters either in 
real or virtual terms (where they operate on the internet) leading to the arrest and 
conviction of terrorists before they have a chance to act.  
 
It must follow that in order to prevent terrorist attacks, the process of radicalisation 
needs to be given much more attention and where higher or further education 
campuses are involved, this must be a matter for those who run our universities and 
colleges. Not every radical is a jihadi, but every jihadi has been a radical. If 
extremism can be contained, so can jihadism. It would seem self-evident that 
universities see that in addition to studying terrorism, they are themselves a site of 
extremist activity. Yet they still seem reluctant to acknowledge this and the 
government’s 2015 counter-terrorism and security bill (which sought to place a duty 
on universities to work with the government to counter radicalisation) was 
successfully amended to please significant numbers of academics, vice-chancellors 
and other notables in the higher education and political spheres (UK Government: 
Counter-terrorism and Security Act, 2015). 
 
Former LibDem government ministers (Ed Davey and Vince Cable) and ‘celebrities’ 
like Eliza Manningham-Buller, the ex-head of MI5, and Lord MacDonald, the former 
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director of public prosecutions, both of whom now work for universities, worked 
with five hundred professors and over twenty vice-chancellors to demand that 
universities be exempted from being required to accept guidance from the 
government in executing its Prevent counter-radicalisation strategy (at the time of 
writing this exemption is still in force). Their opposition to what seemed to some 
observers an eminently sensible measure was based on their insistence that the 
needs of ‘academic freedom’ and ‘free speech’ were not being upheld and that a 
failure to do so was illegal. 
 
It is not possible here to explore the intricacies of a complex legal situation. Baroness 
Manningham-Buller and others relied on section 43 (1) of the Education (No 2) Act 
1986 in respect of ‘freedom of speech’ and section 202 (2) (a) of the Education 
Reform Act 1988 as far as ‘academic freedom’ was concerned (UK Government, 
1986, 1988). What was not pointed out was that the 1986 Act required universities 
to uphold ‘freedom of speech within the law’ for ‘members, students and 
employees’ of the institution and for ‘visiting speakers’, rather than suggesting that 
freedom of speech within universities was an absolute freedom which is currently 
what the 2015 Act implies (because it lacks any qualification). Equally, in respect of 
‘academic freedom’ the 1988 Act stated that this applied only to ‘academic staff’ 
whereas the 2015 Act omits this vital qualification and allows a case to be made that 
it applies to everyone in a university (including students) as well as speakers visiting 
a university.  
 
Baroness Manningham-Buller, now chairman of the Court of Imperial College, 
London, said in parliament: ‘it is a profound irony that in seeking to protect our 
values against this pernicious ideology we are trying to bar…non-violent extremism 
which falls short of incitement to violence or to racial or ethnic hatred’. Now an 
Oxford college head, Lord MacDonald, wrote in similar vein: ‘the idea that 
universities should play a formal role in state surveillance and control is new; and it 
matters because it envisages a new relationship between academics and the security 
and law enforcement agencies. We should treat this unforgiving ground with great 
care…this is a society that, far from feeling secure in its values, is surrendering the 
essence of academic freedom – the belief that the state should lay off the intellect 
unless thoughts amount to real crime’ (MacDonald, 2015). Using the argument that 
‘free speech’ and ‘academic freedom’ must be maintained, they succeeded in forcing 
the government to back down over demands universities monitor and report 
extremism and giving the Home Secretary powers of guidance to them.  
 
Support for jihadist doctrines are rather more than simply ‘pernicious’. Islamism is 
not a form of legitimate democratic thinking, inviting extremists to address young 
British students is not like asking controversial democratic politicians onto campus. 
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As much to the point, freedom of speech ought not to be absolute (incitement, for 
example, should qualify it) and academic freedom applies to academic staff and no 
one else. In fact, extremist speeches made by ‘preachers’ on campus have nothing to 
do with academic freedom which is the freedom of academics to speak as they find 
on academic subjects and to disagree with their colleagues without fear of dismissal. 
It has nothing to do with inviting onto campus extremists who rail against gays, Jews 
and adulterous women. As for free speech as every writer and speaker knows, 
absolute free speech in the UK does not exist, nor should it. Whilst this law exists, 
there is no evidence that universities have ever enabled the prosecution of campus 
extremists. Libel and anti-incitement laws keep our multi-ethnic country safe and 
rightly so.  
 
The refusal to accept that campus radicalisation may present a national security 
problem is bad enough. But its corollary, that universities do not need to do be 
under guidance to prevent it, is no less disturbing. Rather, they should be more than 
ready to help a democratically elected government keep this country, and in 
particular our young Muslim students, as safe as they can. 
 
Unless something very remarkable and unexpected happens to bring peace to the 
global community, intelligence-led activity will not only continue to be needed to 
keep us safe (and keeping citizens safe is one of the very few core duties of every 
democratic government), it will have to be deployed with greater effectiveness and 
by a growing number of professionals. Intelligence studies has a real role to play in 
assisting this process by explaining to students and the public why intelligence 
activity is necessary, why it must always be lawful and how its effectiveness can be 
improved. It does not have to educate the next generation of officers, still less ‘train’ 
them. But if it does what it is meant to do, in a practical and morally perceptive way, 
it will also help develop the professionalism of our intelligence community and, in its 
own way, make us all safer. These are its most important tasks today. 
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Notes:  
 
 
Taylor and Francis, the academic publishers, are due to digitize and publish a vast swathe of secret 
documents from the 1930s to the 1950s (I have an interest in this, as a member of their editorial 
advisory board). 
 
In his above-mentioned 2009 article on what intelligence education should consist of, Rudner 
mentions ‘ethics’ just once, and only in an appendix right at the end of his study (he suggests it could 
be a putative ‘optional’ subject in an ideal intelligence studies programme); the word ‘torture’ does 
not appear at all (although ‘intelligence and interrogations’ is another – optional – subject, along with 
intelligence in literature and film). 
 
For further thinking on this nature of intelligence analysis teaching see Julian Richards The Art and 
Science of Intelligence Analysis (Oxford University Press 2010) and William J Lahneman and Ruben 
Arcos (eds) The Art of Intelligence: Simulations, Exercises and Games Security and Professional 
Intelligence Education Series (Rowman and Littlefield (Lanham 2014).  
 
A noted British academic, Alex Danchev, echoes the thinking of many fellow academics by referring to 
Snowden as a ‘whistleblower’ in ‘Laura Poitras and the problem of Dissent’ in International Affairs Vol 
91 No 2 March 2015 pp 381-392. In his panegyric to Snowden and Poitras, Danchev suggests that 
 33 
Snowden is a ‘model citizen’. In fact, of course, Snowden was not a whistleblower (where that term is 
used to describe someone who exposes criminal activity within an institution): the only crimes 
revealed by his revelations were his own, in stealing British secret documents, and perhaps those of 
The Guardian in publishing them.  
 
Articles 5, 8 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights do not simply lay down the nature of 
those rights, they make it clear that where national security is involved, those rights may be 
restricted; similarly the US Patriot Acts of 2001 and 2005/6 and Article 10. 2 of the Federal German 
Constitution Art 10 1 restricts right of the privacy of communications to safeguard democracy or 
national security. See too the 2015 Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 
on ‘Privacy and Security’ [online] Available at: http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-
reports/special-reports I should declare an interest: I was invited to give written and oral testimony to 
the Committee. 
 
The Binyam Mohamed case to which The Guardian had referred was in one sense resolved a year 
later when Mohammed was awarded a large sum of money in damages by the British government in 
return for not proceeding with his action. However, in another sense it was not resolved because the 
payment prevented further examination in a court of law and no judgement was given. [online] 
Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/binyam-mohamed 
 
Nicola Dandridge, the chief executive of Universities UK, had argued that ‘voluntary’ gender 
segregation in British universities was not in conflict with liberal British values. 
 
As in all academic fields there are fault lines in intelligence studies in the UK, built on shared interests, 
approaches, loyalties and the hard truth that academic advancement and the procurement of grants 
depend on peer approval. Other considerations to bear in mind, including the professionalization of 
intelligence, are discussed in GLEES, A (2007) ‘In Search of a new intelligence system: the British 
experience’. 
 
 
 
 
